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ON JURISDICTIONAL ELEPHANTS AND 
KANGAROO COURTS 
Stephen I. Vladeck* 
One need not look far these days to find proposals for how to ―fix‖ 
U.S. detention policy, especially with respect to the non-citizens detained as 
―enemy combatants‖ at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.1  In the aftermath of the 
Supreme Court‘s June decision in Boumediene v. Bush2—particularly its 
conclusion that the Guantánamo detainees have a constitutional right to 
judicial review3—such proposals have taken on an added sense of urgency, 
as commentators of all stripes grapple with the (now very real) possibility 
that such review will lead to the frustration and/or invalidation of existing 
policies.4 
Within this burgeoning literature, though, the military tribunals con-
vened at Guantánamo under the Military Commissions Act of 20065 (MCA) 
have received curiously short shrift.  Part of the problem, I suspect, is that 
compared to the hundreds of individuals held at Guantánamo (and the thou-
sands in U.S. custody elsewhere) who are not facing trial, the number of in-
dividuals potentially subject to trial by military commission is 
comparatively small.  I also imagine that the relative neglect of the commis-
sions is at least to some degree a result of the absolutism that pervades 





  Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law.  In the interest of full dis-
closure, I should note that I have played a recurring role on the legal team in the Hamdan litigation—
including in the recent habeas proceedings in the D.C. district court—and also co-authored an amicus 
brief on behalf of a group of law professors (and in support of the petitioners) in Boumediene.  Needless 
to say, the views expressed herein are mine alone. 
1
  See, e.g., BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF 
TERROR (2008); Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Editorial, The Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 
11, 2007, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/11/opinion/11katyal.html (link); see 
also Michael B. Mukasey, Editorial, Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2007, at A15, 
available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110010505 (link). 
2
  128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
3
  See id. at 2243–62. 
4
  As just one example, consider a speech delivered by Attorney General Mukasey a little over a 
month after Boumediene, in which he called for a new legislative detention initiative.  See Remarks Pre-
pared for Delivery by Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey at the American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research (July 21, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2008/ag-speech-
0807213.html (link). 
5
  Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.) 
(link). 
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commissions as categorically unconstitutional; some view them as both 
good policy and legally sound; some view them as the only way to deal 
with the thorny problems posed by international terrorism. 
Fortunately, Professor McNeal falls into none of these camps.  Rather, 
his thoughtful essay6 balances a nuanced critique of the existing commis-
sion structure with an understanding of the difficulties Article III courts 
would face in trying the same defendants for the same offenses.  Moreover, 
Professor McNeal is rightly skeptical of the increasingly common calls for a 
hybrid ―national security court‖ to handle the prosecution of a class of ter-
rorism-related offenses and offenders,7 suggesting that there are significant 
obstacles in the way of any transition to such a model. 
I do not disagree with Professor McNeal‘s major critiques of the com-
missions—i.e., that they suffer from undue political influence, unsupervised 
delegation, and a lack of meaningful oversight.  Nor do I disagree that there 
are obstacles yet to be fully appreciated that would frustrate any movement 
toward a ―national security court‖ model.  Rather, I fear only that his analy-
sis is incomplete.  Specifically, Professor McNeal neglects the sweeping 
personal and subject matter jurisdiction conferred upon the commissions by 
the MCA, and the potential repercussions of such dangerously overbroad 
authority.  As I explain in this brief Response, this shortcoming is perhaps 
the single most serious defect in the proposals for a ―national security 
court,‖ because any such institution would necessarily encounter analogous 
jurisdictional issues: namely who could be tried by such courts, and for 
what.  Professor McNeal is unquestionably correct that major obstacles 
stand in the way of post-Boumediene reform, but any meaningful discussion 
of reforms must also focus on the broader—and perhaps more intractable—
jurisdictional issues. 
To unpack this argument, I begin in Part I by identifying the substan-
tive limits that the Constitution imposes (and that the Supreme Court has 
recognized) upon the exercise of military jurisdiction.  In Part II, I turn to 
an analysis of how the MCA transgresses those limits.  Finally, in Part III, I 
suggest how many of the current reform proposals are largely oblivious to 
the significance of the jurisdictional issues discussed herein.  In particular, 
as Part III concludes, resolving the scope of both whom may be subjected to 
less than the traditional Article III criminal process, and for which offenses, 





  Gregory S. McNeal, Beyond Guantánamo: Obstacles and Options, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 28 (2008) (link). 
7
  For a representative sampling, see Glenn M. Sulmasy, The Legal Landscape After Hamdan: The 
Creation of Homeland Security Courts, 13 NEW ENG. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 1 (2006); Amos Guiora & 
John T. Parry, Debate, Light at the End of the Pipeline?: Choosing a Forum for Suspected Terrorists, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 356 (2008), available at 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/terrorcourts.pdf (link); Andrew C. McCarthy & Alykhan Vel-
shi, We Need a National Security Court (2006) (unpublished white paper submitted to American Enter-
prise Institute, on file with the Northwestern University Law Review). 
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Boumediene reform. 
I. THE SUBSTANTIVE LIMITS ON MILITARY JURISDICTION 
In the court-martial system, it has long been black-letter law that both 
the Constitution and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),8 suc-
cessor to the Articles of War, condition the personal jurisdiction of military 
courts on the ―military status of the accused.‖9  The constitutional limit, at 
least, comes from the language of Article I, Section 8, Clause 14, which 
grants Congress power ―To make Rules for the Government and Regulation 
of the land and naval Forces,‖10 and thereby simultaneously constrains Con-
gress‘s power to subject individuals who are not members of ―the land and 
naval Forces‖ to military jurisdiction.11  Although the Supreme Court has 
abandoned any notion that the Constitution limits the subject matter of of-
fenses triable by courts-martial,12 the limitation on personal jurisdiction has 
remained sacrosanct.13 
Military commissions, of course, are birds of a different feather.14  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has been careful to police the jurisdiction 
of such ad hoc courts as well.  Moreover, and in sharp distinction to the 
court-martial context, the Court has repeatedly identified limits on both the 
personal and subject matter jurisdiction of such tribunals.  
As Justice Stevens explained in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,15 military com-
missions have traditionally been used in three situations.  The first category 
includes situations in which martial law is in force, where the commissions 
serve as substitutes for the non-functioning civilian courts.16  The second 
(and related) category includes situations where a temporary military gov-
ernment is established to rule over occupied enemy territory.17  Finally, the 
third category centers on the use of commissions to try combatants for vi-





  10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2006) (link). 
9
  Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 439 (1987) (link); see also Kinsella v. United States ex rel. 
Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 240–41 (1960) (link).  
10
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
11
  See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1957) (plurality opinion) (link). 
12
  In O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (link), the Court enunciated a ―service connection‖ 
test, requiring in addition that the substantive offense be related to the defendant‘s military service.  Id. 
at 272–73.  O’Callahan was subsequently (and controversially) overruled by Solorio.  As Chief Justice 
Rehnquist there explained, ―determinations concerning the scope of court-martial jurisdiction over of-
fenses committed by servicemen [is] a matter reserved for Congress.‖  Solorio, 483 U.S. at 440. 
13
  See, e.g., United States v. Hart, 66 M.J. 273, 275 (C.A.A.F. 2008). 
14
  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 590 (2006) (―The military commission, a tribunal nei-
ther mentioned in the Constitution nor created by statute, was born of military necessity.‖) (link). 
15
  548 U.S. 557. 
16
  See id. at 595. 
17
  See id. at 595–96 (quoting Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 314 (1946)). 
18
  See id. at 596 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1942)). 
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vant subset for present purposes—Stevens quoted William Winthrop‘s 
sic treatise on military law for the proposition that: 
[A] military commission not established pursuant to martial law or an occupa-
tion may try only ―[i]ndividuals of the enemy‘s army who have been guilty of 
illegitimate warfare or other offences in violation of the laws of war‖ and 
members of one‘s own army ―who, in time of war, become chargeable with 
crimes or offences not cognizable, or triable, by the criminal courts or under 
the Articles of war.‖19 
Winthrop‘s understanding was first adopted by the Court in Ex parte 
Quirin, which upheld the military commissions convened by President 
Roosevelt to try Nazi saboteurs because ―[b]y the Articles of 
War, . . . Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally 
do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or of-
fenses against the law of war in appropriate cases.‖20  In other words, al-
though Quirin interpreted the Articles of War as authorizing military 
tribunals for ―offenders or offenses against the law of war,‖ the same pas-
sage suggested that Congress might not be able to go further—that the Ar-
ticles of War may have conferred jurisdiction upon military commissions to 
their constitutional limit.  As Chief Justice Stone concluded for the Court, 
Congress, in addition to making rules for the government of our Armed 
Forces, has thus exercised its authority to define and punish offenses against 
the law of nations by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the juris-
diction of military commissions to try persons for offenses which, according to 
the rules and precepts of the law of nations, and more particularly the law of 
war, are cognizable by such tribunals.21 
Thus, as Justice Stevens would later explain, ―the Quirin Court recog-
nized that Congress had simply preserved what power, under the Constitu-
tion and the common law of war, the President had had before 1916 to 
convene military commissions—with the express condition that the Presi-
dent and those under his command comply with the law of war.‖22  As ―law-
of-war courts,‖ military commissions were thus limited to exercising juris-
diction over those triable by the laws of war for offenses against the laws of 
war.23  Critically, where military commissions were concerned, Quirin sug-
gested not just that the Articles of War constrained both their personal and 
their subject matter jurisdiction to that recognized by the laws of war (as 





  Id. at 597–98 (quoting WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 838 (2d ed. 1920) 
(alteration in original)). 
20
  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28 (emphasis added). 
21
  Id. 
22
  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593; see also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 13 (1946) (―Neither Congres-
sional action nor the military orders constituting the commission authorized it to place petitioner on trial 
unless the charge preferred against him is of a violation of the law of war.‖) (link). 
23
  See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 641 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (echoing this understanding). 
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same limitation. 
II. THE LIMITLESSNESS OF THE MCA‘S JURISDICTION 
Notwithstanding the limits on military jurisdiction identified in Quirin 
and later cases,24 the MCA, enacted in response to Hamdan, conferred broad 
jurisdiction upon military commissions with regard to both the offenders 
and offenses triable by such courts.  After briefly outlining the background 
to the MCA, the rest of Part II examines the potential limitlessness of the 
MCA‘s personal and subject matter jurisdiction. 
A. Hamdan and the MCA 
Applying Quirin‘s formulation, the Supreme Court in Hamdan struck 
down the military commissions established by President Bush pursuant to a 
2001 executive order.25  Although the Court sidestepped the question of 
whether the commissions lacked personal jurisdiction over Hamdan,26 a 
four-Justice plurality concluded that none of the particular acts the govern-
ment alleged Hamdan to have committed violated the law of war27 and, 
more fundamentally, that the offense with which Hamdan was charged—
conspiracy—is not within the subject matter jurisdiction of a law-of-war 
military commission.28 
Congress responded to Hamdan by enacting the MCA.29  With regard 
to personal jurisdiction, new 10 U.S.C. § 948c provided that ―[a]ny alien 
unlawful enemy combatant is subject to trial by military commission under 
this chapter,‖ and new 10 U.S.C. § 948a defined ―unlawful enemy comba-
tant‖ as, inter alia, ―a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has pur-





  Indeed, Quirin is only the first of many Supreme Court decisions during and following World 
War II that emphasized the limits of military jurisdiction.  Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the 
Court handed down dozens of important decisions further clarifying the statutory and constitutional lim-
its on the offenses (and, more often, the offenders) properly triable before military courts in general, and 
courts-martial in particular.  See, e.g., Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 248 
(1960) (military jurisdiction cannot be extended to reach the wife of a soldier stationed in Germany for a 
noncapital offense); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 3–5 (1957) (plurality) (military jurisdiction cannot be 
extended to civilian dependents of servicemen overseas for capital offenses in times of peace); United 
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14–17 (1955) (military jurisdiction cannot be extended to ex-
servicemen with no ongoing relationship to the military) (link); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953) 
(plurality); Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952). 
25
  The order in question was Military Order of November 13, 2001—Detention, Treatment, and Tri-
al of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 FED. REG. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) (link). 
26
  See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 585 n.16. 
27
  Id. at 600 (plurality).  Justice Kennedy did not join this Part—Part V—or Part VI-D-iv of Justice 
Stevens‘s opinion.  See id. at 638 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
28
  Id. at 600 (plurality). 
29
  See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 986 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (―Everyone who has followed the 
interaction between Congress and the Supreme Court knows full well that one of the primary purposes 
of the MCA was to overrule Hamdan.‖), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (link). 
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co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant.‖30  
In new 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b), the MCA conferred subject matter juris-
diction upon the new commissions with respect to twenty-eight separate of-
fenses, including the offenses of conspiracy31—notwithstanding the 
plurality opinion in Hamdan—and providing material support to terrorism.32  
In so vigorously acting to define with precision the scope of the authority 
military commissions were to exercise, Congress necessarily implicated a 
host of difficult constitutional questions concerning the limits of that power. 
B. The MCA’s Personal Jurisdiction and the Laws of War 
First, with respect to personal jurisdiction, the critical language in new 
§ 948a is the disjunction—suggesting that individuals subject to trial by 
military commission include those who have actually engaged in hostilities 
or those who ―purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the 
United States or its co-belligerents.‖  In a vacuum, this language might 
seem relatively uncontroversial.  However, in recent years, the U.S. gov-
ernment has repeatedly advanced an expansive interpretation of what it 
means to provide ―material support‖ to terrorist organizations in civilian 
criminal prosecutions, as 18 U.S.C. § 2339B has become the Justice De-





  10 U.S.C. § 948a(1)(a)(i) (emphasis added).  The statute defines ―lawful enemy combatant‖ as 
one who is ―a member of the regular forces of a State party engaged in hostilities against the United 
States,‖ ―a member of a militia, volunteer corps, or organized resistance movement belonging to a State 
party engaged in such hostilities, which are under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign 
recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the law of war,‖ or ―a member of a reg-
ular armed force who professes allegiance to a government engaged in such hostilities, but not recog-
nized by the United States.‖  Id. § 948a(2). 
31
  Id. § 950v(b)(28) (―Any person subject to this chapter who conspires to commit one or more 
substantive offenses triable by military commission under this chapter, and who knowingly does any 
overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, shall be punished, if death results to one or more of the 
victims, by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct, and, 
if death does not result to any of the victims, by such punishment, other than death, as a military com-
mission under this chapter may direct.‖). 
32
  Id. § 950v(b)(25)(A) (―Any person subject to this chapter who provides material support or re-
sources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, an act of 
terrorism (as set forth in [10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(24)]), or who intentionally provides material support or 
resources to an international terrorist organization engaged in hostilities against the United States, know-
ing that such organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as so set forth), shall be punished as a 
military commission under this chapter may direct.‖). 
33
  See Eric Lichtblau, A Seldom-Used Statute Becomes the Justice Department's Antiterror Weapon 
of Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at B15; see also John T. Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal 
Process, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 774–75 (2007).  Others have questioned the appropriateness 
(and even the constitutionality) of various applications of the material support provisions in Title 18.  
See, e.g., United States v. Afshari, 446 F.3d 915, 915–22 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from 
the denial of rehearing en banc).  The more relevant point here, though, is that the zeal with which the 
government has pursued an expansive view of what it means to provide material support in the civilian 
context suggests that a similarly expansive definition might be argued for in prosecutions under the 
MCA.  Put another way, there is every reason to suspect that the government would exploit, rather than 
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In addition, and based in part on this understanding, the government 
suggested in a notorious exchange at oral argument in one of the Guantá-
namo cases that it could subject to military jurisdiction ―[a] little old lady in 
Switzerland who writes checks to what she thinks is a charity that helps or-
phans in Afghanistan but [what] really is a front to finance al-Qaeda activi-
ties.‖34  In other words, the provision of material support necessary to 
trigger military jurisdiction would include charitable donations lacking a 
specific intent to support hostilities against the United States.  The ―material 
support‖ language thus suggests that the MCA‘s definition of ―unlawful 
enemy combatant‖ might actually extend to individuals who, under the laws 
of war, are not even ―combatants‖ in the first place—and who are therefore 
not subject to trial by military commission, even if they are properly subject 
to trial for civilian criminal offenses.35 
Second, and related, even where a detainee is clearly a ―combatant,‖ 
the distinction the MCA draws between ―lawful enemy combatants‖ and 
―unlawful enemy combatants‖ differs in important respects from the com-
parable distinction made by the laws of war, as Professor Allison Danner 
has thoughtfully explained.36  Just for starters, under the laws of war, being 
a combatant is not per se unlawful.37 
My point here is not that the MCA categorically confers personal juris-
diction on military commissions in violation of the laws of war.  Rather, it 
is just to suggest that the statute could easily support personal jurisdiction in 
at least some cases where the defendant would not be subject to military ju-
risdiction under the laws of war.  In such cases, the constitutionality of the 
exercise of military jurisdiction would be in serious doubt. 
C. The MCA’s Subject matter Jurisdiction and the Laws of War 
Although the MCA itself asserts otherwise,38 there is also a strong ar-
                                                                                                                           
carefully police, the potential open-endedness of the definition. 
34
  In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005) (alterations in origi-
nal; internal quotation marks omitted). 
35
  To be sure, definitions of ―combatancy‖ implicate a host of related—and complex—questions. 
See, e.g., INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 135–50 (2d ed. 2000); see also al Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 
F.3d 213, 312–25 (4th Cir. 2008) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (surveying the 
difficulties inherent in defining ―combatancy‖) (link).  My goal here is not to suggest an exhaustive de-
finition of who may be treated as a combatant under international humanitarian (and U.S.) law.  Rather, 
it is to suggest that the breadth of the personal jurisdiction contemplated by the MCA seems to include 
individuals who have not been traditionally treated as combatants under any prevailing definition.  
36
  See Allison M. Danner, Defining Unlawful Enemy Combatants: A Centripetal Story, 43 TEX. 
INT‘L L.J. 1 (2007), available at http://tilj.org/docs/J43-1_Danner.pdf (link). 
37
  Robert K. Goldman & Brian D. Tittemore, Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afg-
hanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, ASIL 
TASK FORCE PAPERS (Am. Soc‘y of Int‘l Law), Dec. 2002, at 7, available at 
http://www.pegc.us/archive/Journals/goldman.pdf (link). 
38
  See 10 U.S.C. § 950p(a) (―The provisions of this subchapter codify offenses that have traditional-
ly been triable by military commissions. This chapter does not establish new crimes that did not exist 
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gument that at least some of the substantive offenses over which it confers 
jurisdiction are not recognized by the laws of war.  Indeed, as noted above, 
a four-Justice plurality in Hamdan concluded that conspiracy is not an in-
dependent substantive offense under the laws of war.39  As Justice Stevens 
summarized: 
The crime of ―conspiracy‖ has rarely if ever been tried as such in this country 
by any law-of-war military commission not exercising some other form of ju-
risdiction, and does not appear in either the Geneva Conventions or the Hague 
Conventions—the major treaties on the law of war.  Winthrop explains that 
under the common law governing military commissions, it is not enough to in-
tend to violate the law of war and commit overt acts in furtherance of that in-
tention unless the overt acts either are themselves offenses against the law of 
war or constitute steps sufficiently substantial to qualify as an attempt.40 
The trial judge in Hamdan nevertheless concluded that ―conspiracy‖ 
under the MCA is an offense recognized by the laws of war.41  Its analysis, 
though, is hardly convincing since it relies on the argument that, in the 
MCA (and notwithstanding Hamdan), Congress so recognized—that Con-
gress could make a particular crime an offense against the law of war on 
Day 1 when it was not so recognized on Day 0.  It simply cannot follow, 
though, that Congress‘s power ―To define and punish . . . Offences against 
the Law of Nations‖42 includes the power to define the ―Law of Nations‖ (of 
which the law of war is a part) itself.43  
More controversially, the MCA also defines as a war crime ―material 
support for terrorism,‖ even though there is simply no evidence that such an 
offense has ever been treated as a violation of the laws of war by anyone 
other than the United States.44  As with the conspiracy charges against 
                                                                                                                           
before its enactment, but rather codifies those crimes for trial by military commission.‖). 
39
  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 603–12 (2006) (plurality). 
40
  Id. at 603–04 (footnotes omitted); see also George P. Fletcher, On the Crimes Subject to Prosecu-
tion in Military Commissions, 5 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 39, 46 (2007). 
41
  See United States v. Hamdan, No. D012, slip op. at 6–7 (Mil. Comm‘n. July 14, 2008), available 
at http://howappealing.law.com/HamdanRulingMotionsToDismissExPostFacto.pdf (link).  
42
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
43
  Indeed, an old—but still viable—Supreme Court decision seems to prohibit exactly that.  See 
United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 195–97 (1820) (holding that Congress can not rede-
fine piracy to encompass any murder on the high seas in order to bring those crimes within its enume-
rated powers) (link); see also Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power to 
“Define and Punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations”, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 474 
(2000) (―The debates at the Constitutional Convention made clear that Congress would have the power 
to punish only actual violations of the law of nations, not to create new offenses.‖).  In Hamdan‘s case, 
at least, this point was largely mooted when Hamdan was acquitted on the conspiracy charges.  See Jerry 
Markon, Hamdan Guilty of Terror Support, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/08/06/ST2008080601313.html (link). 
44
  See David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil over the Guantánamo 
Military Commissions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 131, 177 (2008), available at 
http://www.lclark.edu/org/lclr/objects/LCB_12_1_Art7_Glazier.pdf (―[W]hile providing material sup-
port to terrorism is clearly an offense against U.S. federal law, its trial as a war crime seems unprece-
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Hamdan, the trial judge‘s analysis of whether material support for terrorism 
has been recognized as an offense against the law of war is rather conclu-
sory,45 and may well form the substance of a potential appeal of Hamdan‘s 
conviction. 
In addition, and as with conspiracy, the analysis of whether material 
support has been recognized as an offense against the law of war dovetails 
with whether its inclusion as a substantive offense violates the Constitu-
tion‘s Ex Post Facto Clause.46  After all, even if Congress does have the 
power to give substantive content to the law of nations (including the law of 
war), there is a strong argument that Congress cannot apply that power re-
troactively so as to subject a defendant to trial for a violation of the law of 
war that was not a violation of the law of war at the time the unlawful con-
duct took place.47 
Thus, whether or not the limitation on the personal jurisdiction of mili-
tary commissions is constitutionally grounded, there can be little question 
that the challenges to the subject matter jurisdiction thereof are inextricably 
intermixed with constitutional questions of the highest order.  Again, I do 
not mean to suggest that the commissions are therefore categorically un-
constitutional, but only that there are serious questions as to the scope of 
their jurisdiction that, at least as of this writing, remain unanswered.48 
                                                                                                                           
dented.‖) (footnote omitted) (link).  
45
  See Hamdan, No. D012, slip op. at 6 (―In light of Congress‘s enumerated power to define and 
punish offenses against the law of nations, and its express declaration that in doing so it has not enacted 
a ‗new crime[] that did not exist before its enactment,‘ the Commission is inclined to defer to Congress‘s 
determination.‖); see also Posting of Kevin Jon Heller to OpinioJuris, 
http://opiniojuris.org/2008/08/07/why-hamdans-material-support-convictions-violate-the-ex-post-facto-
clause (Aug. 7, 2008, 8:19 a.m. EST) (arguing that material support for terrorism has not been consi-
dered a war crime) (link); Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/08/what-are-war-crimes-for-which-hamdan.html (Aug. 6, 2008, 1:13 
p.m. EST) (arguing that Hamdan‘s alleged conduct was not a violation of the laws of war at the time he 
engaged in the acts) (link). 
46
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
47
  This is not an open-and-shut argument.  Using Hamdan‘s case as an example, the crime of pro-
viding material support to terrorist organizations was a federal crime at all relevant times; it was just not 
triable by a military commission until the MCA was enacted.  Thus, the question would be whether the 
Ex Post Facto Clause bars the subjection of an individual to military jurisdiction for an offense that was 
only triable in civilian courts at the time of its commission.  I think the answer is yes, based on Justice 
Chase‘s discussion in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 389–91 (1796) (Chase, J.) (defining ex post 
facto laws).  In particular, Chase included as an example of an ex post facto law a statute that altered the 
rules of evidence to either lower the government‘s burden of proof or to reduce the amount of evidence 
necessary to convict for an offense committed before the law was enacted.  See id.  The Court has ac-
cepted Chase‘s account as authoritative.  See Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 611–12 (2003) (link).  
I admit that the ex post facto issue is open to question, but that is exactly the point. 
48
  Cf. Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d 130, 134–37 (D.D.C. 2008) (declining to reach merits of 
Hamdan‘s pre-trial challenge to the commission‘s jurisdiction) (link). 
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D. The Absence of Collateral Review 
Finally, I would be remiss not to highlight one last jurisdictional flaw 
in the commissions created under the MCA: the absence of collateral re-
view.  Since shortly after the founding, the Supreme Court has recognized 
the authority—indeed, the obligation—of the Article III courts to entertain 
collateral challenges to the exercise of military jurisdiction.49 And since the 
end of the Civil War, the Court has recognized habeas corpus as the appro-
priate procedural vehicle through which to vindicate such claims.50  Not-
withstanding this venerable line of precedent, the MCA bars habeas 
petitions relating to military commission trials, both pre- and post-
judgment.  As provided by the new 10 U.S.C. § 950j(b),  
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter and notwithstanding any other 
provision of law (including section 2241 of title 28 or any other habeas corpus 
provision), no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider 
any claim or cause of action whatsoever . . . relating to the prosecution, trial, or 
judgment of a military commission under this chapter, including challenges to 
the lawfulness of procedures of military commissions under this chapter.51 
Because the MCA also bars interlocutory appeals by military commis-
sion defendants (but not by the government)52—even where the appeal chal-
lenges the jurisdiction of the trial court53—the statute thus appears to 





  See, e.g., In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 150 (1890) (―It cannot be doubted that the civil courts may 
in any case inquire into the jurisdiction into the jurisdiction of a court martial.‖) (link).  Before the Civil 
War, the civilian courts entertained such challenges in various forms, including in the context of actions 
for trespass, see, e.g., Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820) (link); Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 
Cranch) 331 (1806) (link); and replevin, see, e.g., Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827) (link). 
50
  See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 131 (1866) (finding that a military commission 
did not have jurisdiction to try the petitioner) (link); see also Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 16 (1879) (―If 
a reasonable doubt exists whether [the petitioner is] subject to the jurisdiction of a court-martial, the pe-
titioner is entitled to the writ.‖) (link). 
51
  10 U.S.C. § 950j(b) (2006). 
52
  Compare id. § 950f (Review by Court of Military Commission Review), with id. § 950d (Appeal 
by the United States).  To be sure, it is not uncommon to allow the government—but not the defen-
dant—to take certain interlocutory appeals in criminal cases, given that the government cannot generally 
appeal acquittals (because of double jeopardy concerns), while the defendant can appeal convictions.  
But even in the court-martial system, which creates just such a regime for interlocutory appeals, see 
United States v. Lopez de Victoria, 66 M.J. 67, 68–69 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (describing the creation of inter-
locutory appeals by the Military Justice Act of 1983) (link), there is no barrier whatsoever to the defen-
dant collaterally attacking the jurisdiction of the trial court, see, e.g., Watada v. Head, 530 F. Supp. 2d 
1136, 1145–49 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (noting that petitioner must meet only custody and exhaustion re-
quirements to pursue habeas relief on collateral issue of double jeopardy). 
53
  See Khadr v. United States, 529 F.3d 1112, 1117–19 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (link). The intermediate 
appeals court under the MCA—the ―Court of Military Commission Review‖—had reversed the trial 
court‘s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over Khadr. See generally United States v. Khadr, No. 07-
001 (C.M.C.R. Sept. 24, 2007), available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/CMCR%20ruling%209-24-07.pdf (link). 
54
  Cf. Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d 130, 136–37 (D.D.C. 2008) (refusing to issue a preliminary 
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The Supreme Court has never expressly held that the scope of the Con-
stitution‘s Suspension Clause (which, thanks to Boumediene,55 now covers 
the Guantánamo detainees) includes a detainee‘s right to contest their ame-
nability to military jurisdiction.  Such a reading may logically follow, 
though, since the civilian courts generally do not exercise supervisory juris-
diction over military courts,56 and so collateral review of military jurisdic-
tion is, in effect, review of a form of extrajudicial executive detention.  In 
any event, if a detainee ever claims a right not to be tried by a military court 
in the first place—as the Supreme Court in Hamdan concluded with respect 
to Hamdan himself—such a right is necessarily frustrated by the MCA, 
which, at most,57 allows for vindication of such a right only after the fact.58 
III. NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS AS JURISDICTIONAL PROXIES 
I doubt very much that Professor McNeal disagrees with the above dis-
cussion and analysis.  Even the quickest perusal of his cogent essay reveals 
that his focus was elsewhere, and a criticism of a paper as not covering a 
topic that the author consciously neglected necessarily rings hollow.  How-
ever, inasmuch as Professor McNeal suggests how the flaws he identifies 
might be fixed by policymakers going forward, I felt the need to pen this re-
sponse to emphasize that there are bigger problems lurking that would have 
to be addressed first—problems of which the above analysis only begins to 
scratch the surface. 
Indeed, although I discuss this issue in more detail elsewhere,59 one of 
the remarkable points about another set of reforms—proposals for so-called 
―national security courts‖—is how light they are on the details of just who 
will be subject to trial before such tribunals, and for what.  Instead, for 
those proposals focusing on the problem of criminal prosecution (some fo-
cus only on the related issues of detention and review thereof), the grava-
                                                                                                                           
injunction to bar Hamdan‘s trial pending the resolution of his collateral challenges thereto, but not de-
ciding whether the MCA actually precluded jurisdiction over such claims). 
55
  See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008) (―We hold that [the Suspension Clause] 
has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.‖) (link). 
56
  See, e.g., Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 110–11 (1950) (link). 
57
  Even then, there are reasons to doubt the scope of the post-conviction review provided for by the 
statute in 10 U.S.C. §§ 950b, 950c, 950f, and 950g(c) (2006).  But I‘ll assume here for the sake of argu-
ment that post-conviction review is plenary, at least as to questions of law. 
58
  I take up the potential unconstitutionality of the MCA‘s preclusion of collateral review in Stephen 
I. Vladeck, Military Jurisdiction, the Right Not To Be Tried, and the Suspension Clause After Boume-
diene, HUM. RTS. BRIEF (forthcoming Fall 2008) (manuscript at 3, on file with the Northwestern Univer-
sity Law Review). 
59
  See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case Against National Security Courts, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript on file with the Northwestern University Law Review) [hereinafter 
Vladeck, The Case Against National Security Courts]; see also THE CONST. PROJECT, A CRITIQUE OF 
―NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS‖ 2–3 (2008), (noting the ―intrinsic and inescapable problem‖ of setting 
details for the definitions of the scope of national security court powers, available at 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Critique_of_the_National_Security_Courts.pdf (link). 
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men of the analysis tends to be nothing more than a sustained critique of 
how Article III courts have handled terrorism prosecutions.60  Such critiques 
are difficult to reconcile with a recent Human Rights First report concluding 
to the contrary that the Article III courts have ably handled the myriad chal-
lenges posed by terrorism cases.61 But even if these critiques were convinc-
ing, they hardly ask the question of how we‘ll decide the scope of these new 
courts‘ jurisdiction, let alone provide an answer thereto. 
As the above discussion suggests, questions as to the personal and sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of these new hybrid courts are more than just curios-
ities of policy.  The more the procedural and evidentiary rules of these new 
courts differ from traditional Article III trials, the more that the scope of 
their jurisdiction might implicate serious constitutional concerns, especially 
if there is no meaningful way to collaterally challenge their jurisdiction in 
an Article III court.  The more closely these new courts resemble traditional 
Article III courts in their rules of procedure and evidence (thereby alleviat-
ing some of these jurisdictional issues), the less powerfully arguments for 
their utility and their necessity will resonate.  My own view is that this la-
cuna is precisely why national security courts are neither useful nor neces-
sary.62  At the very least, though, even supporters of such reforms must 
concede the centrality of the jurisdictional questions to any evaluation of 
the proposals‘ merits. 
And that, ultimately, is the conundrum faced by policymakers looking 
for creative solutions to the military commission morass after Boumediene.  
At least with respect to criminal trials, the Constitution forces the issue, and 
narrowly circumscribes the class of individuals who can be subjected to an-
ything less than the full protections enjoyed by defendants in Article III 
courts.  As Justice Black explained for the plurality in Reid v. Covert: 63 
Under the grand design of the Constitution civilian courts are the normal repo-
sitories of power to try persons charged with crimes against the United States.  
And to protect persons brought before these courts, Article III and the Fifth, 
Sixth, and Eighth Amendments establish the right to trial by jury, to indictment 
by a grand jury and a number of other specific safeguards.  By way of contrast 
the jurisdiction of military tribunals is a very limited and extraordinary juris-
diction derived from the cryptic language in Art.  I, § 8, and, at most, was in-
tended to be only a narrow exception to the normal and preferred method of 
trial in courts of law.  Every extension of military jurisdiction is an encroach-
ment on the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and, more important, acts as a de-





  See, e.g., McCarthy & Velshi, supra note 7. 
61
  See RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING 
TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (2008) (white paper for Human Rights First), available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf (link). 
62
  See generally Vladeck, The Case Against National Security Courts, supra note 59. 
63
  354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
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protections.64 
That is why definitions matter, and why it is mostly pointless to have a 
conversation about ―national security courts‖ or other hybrid criminal tri-
bunals until and unless there is some consensus—or at least some clarity—
as to the scope of the jurisdiction that those courts will exercise.  Professor 
McNeal is rightly to be commended for moving the ball forward by identi-
fying other weaknesses in the process created by the MCA, but my own 
view, for better or worse, is that those weaknesses pale in comparison to the 
structural and potentially insurmountable jurisdictional flaws enmeshed 





  Id. at 21 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 30 (―There is no indication that the 
Founders contemplated setting up a rival system of military courts to compete with civilian courts for 
jurisdiction over civilians who might have some contact or relationship with the armed forces.  Courts-
martial were not to have concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law over non-military America.‖). 
